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PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY TO LAW
Christopher T. Wonnell*

I.

PURE NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY, APPLIED POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW

At least since the 1971 publication of John Rawls' book A Theory
of Justice, the discipline of political philosophy has had considerable
effect upon legal scholarship. 1 In private law, for example, the influence of political philosophy has been pervasive, significantly affecting
theories of contracts,2 torts,3 and property.4 But perhaps the most important influence has been in the area of constitutional law, a legal
realm that explicitly presents the question of_classes of judgments that
ought not to be made by majoritarian political institutions. 5
The transition from abstract political philosophy to concrete legal
application is, however, not a simple one, and it is these transition
problems that this article seeks to explore. At least since the time of
Immanuel Kant, political philosophers have been taunted6 with the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1979, Northwestern University; J.D. 1982, University of Michigan. - Ed. I would like to express my appreciation to the
following individuals whose comments upon earlier drafts of this article were very helpful: Larry
Alexander, Barbara Banoff, Randy Barnett, Don Dripps, Paul Horton, Maimon Schwarzchild,
and Paul Wohlmuth.
1. Buchanan, A Critical Introduction to Rawls' Theory of Justice, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY
OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (1980) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE] (Rawls has inspired "a renaissance in political philosophy in America and the English-speaking world
generally.").
2. See, e.g., Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (libertarian consent theory supports freedom of contract); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1717-21 (1976) (altruistic political philosophy supports
compulsory terms in certain contracts).
3. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) {libertarian
defense of causality-based tort liability); Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM L. REV. 495
(I 986) (utilitarian and rights-based approaches to risky conduct opposed in favor of approach
accommodating both concerns).
4. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53 (1974) (political philosophy
defense of private property acquisition); R. DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
181, 200 (1985) {Liberalism opposes broad property rights over acquired objects but favors
"some right to property" over "a range of personal possessions essential to dignity.").
5. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Prindple, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 517 (1981); Choper,
The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 810, 830 (1974).
6. See I. KANT, Theory and Practice Concerning the Cammon Saying: This May Be True in
Theory But Does Nat Apply ta Practice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 412 (C. Friedrich trans.
1949).
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cliche that their philosophies might "sound good in theory but won't
work in practice." As a general critique of abstract theory, this timehonored phrase is objectionable, for it insulates the implicit theories
that underlie present practices from theoretical criticism. 7 Nevertheless, this article takes the position that the cliche crudely and imperfectly states a very important truth: Some political philosophies that
may be unobjectionable as pure normative systems are nevertheless
likely to produce systematically objectionable results when they are
concretely applied. Stated another way, this article seeks to construct
a theory of the problems likely to be encountered in the application of
political philosophies to legal practice.
It is useful to begin the analysis by exploring an ambiguity in the
function that the discipline of political philosophy seeks to fulfill. To
keep the discussion as concrete as possible, let us use as an example
the legal and political question of whether the confiscation of private
property to benefit the needy is proper. 8 Different political philosophies have presented varying answers to this question, ranging from
the staunchly pro-property stance of the libertarian Robert Nozick9 to
the ambivalent positions of Rawls 10 or the utilitarians 11 to the firmly
anti-property views of the Critical Legal Studies movement. 12 Despite
this race to discover the proper answer, however, it is rarely noticed
that the question itself is ambiguous. On the one hand, political philosophers might be trying to determine whether the confiscation of
property would be justified if it does benefit the needy. More generally, this conception of political philosophy would entail hypothetically assuming factual arguments to be true and assessing the
7. See J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 38384 (1936).
8. This question is posed explicitly, for example, in R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROI'·
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 306-29 (1985).
9. See R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 26-35, 150-64. Not all libertarians agree with Nozick that
moral rights extend to basic resources; it is the right in one's own person and talents that unites
them. See Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Ma11 and Ma1111a ill the Liberal State, 28
UCLA L. REV. 816, 816-17 (1981) (arguing that "the question that most seriously divides liberals and separates the welfare-statists from the libertarians" is "the question of whether one is
morally entitled to the fruits of one's good fortune in life's natural lottery of endowments and
opportunities in the face of claims of superior need due to misfortune").
10. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 265-74 (1971). Rawls' theory of justice is concerned with the "basic structure" of society, i.e.. its "principal economic and social arrangements" in which Rawls expressly includes the institution of "private property in the mean~ of
production." Id. at 7. He concludes that his theory is compatible with capitalism or socialism.
11. See Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behm·ior, in UTll ITARIANISM ANll
BEYOND 39, 41 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982).
12. See, e.g.. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1713-21 (contrasting the "ideal of individualism"
which "provides a justification for the fundamental legal in~titutions of criminal law, property,
tort, and contract" with a competing "ideal of altruism").
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normative sufficiency of those factual contentions as justifications for
legal rules. Alternatively, political philosophers might be seeking to
inform courts (and other political actors) as to whether they should
allow the taking of private property if they perceive that such action
would benefit the needy. This alternative conception of political philosophy identifies a set of moral norms that judges and legislators
should personally embrace and apply to the factual world as they perceive it.
In short, there are two distinct conceptions of the function that
political philosophy seeks to perform, i.e., the questions it attempts to
answer. For the sake of easy reference, I will call the conception of
political philosophy as passing normative judgment upon factual theses assumed to be true "pure normative philosophy," and the alternative conception of a set of values to be internalized and applied by
judges, legislators, and other political actors "applied political
philosophy."
The contention to be advanced is that these two conceptions are
indeed distinct, and that only a remarkable coincidence could make
the same political philosophy ideal for both functions. The problem is
that modern political philosophers are never clear about which of the
two functions they want their philosophy to fulfill, and as a result they
strain mightily to make the same philosophical concepts satisfy two
fundamentally distinct goals. At best, this neglect of the distinction
results in confusion; at worst, it overlooks the serious consequence
that a particular philosophy might be quite appropriate for one function and yet grossly inadequate for the other. And it is in the area of
law, where theories are applied by real human actors employing tools
of vast coercive power, that the difficulties of overlooking the distinction are most directly manifested.
In what ways might pure normative philosophy (PNP) and applied
political ph~losophy (APP) differ? Let us begin with a statement of the
purpose of political philosophy in these two conceptions:
PNP: Political philosophy seeks to identify the types of arguments
which, if true, would morally justify particular types of legal rules and
political actions.
APP: Political philosophy seeks to identify a set of values that would
produce morally appropriate results if the values identified by the philosophy were sincerely held by judges, legislators, and other political actors.

This difference in purpose suggests the possibility that in certain
circumstances the two ideals might diverge. For example, suppose
that a political actor was tempted to placate a particular special interest in a way that could not in fact be philosophically justified, i.e., an
omniscient observer would say it did not promote maximum happi-
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ness, justice, etc. The possibility would still remain that the political
actor might be able to convince herself that the action in question did
promote the philosophical ideal. If a particular philosophical ideal
was especially susceptible to such efforts at rationalization, would that
argue that there was something wrong with the ideal itself or simply
that it was not being followed? Surely that answer would depend upon
what function the ideal was seeking to fulfill. Thus the first concrete
distinction emerges:
1. PNP: The temptation of public officials to rationalize narrow ends
as being consistent with the philosophy is outside the scope of political
philosophy, which is concerned with assessing the normative status of
the successful implementation of alternative governing philosophies.
Rationalization is simply one of many reasons why real world actors
may fall short of a particular philosophical ideal; it does not discredit the
ideal itself.
APP: Political philosophy is concerned with the values legal and political actors hold, so it is important to know how easy it will be for power
holders to rationalize and psychologically harmonize the temptations of
power with a sincere commitment to a particular philosophy. If such
rationalization is extremely easy with a particular philosophy, this may
be a good argument against that philosophy.

A related and more general problem is that legal and political actors often have imperfect information. Political philosophies do not
speak for themselves; they must be interpreted and applied. As a result, legal actors are likely to pass some laws or issue some decisions in
the hope of vindicating a specific philosophical ideal when in fact they
are hindering that ideal. If a political philosophy is susceptible to especially grievous mistakes based upon limited knowledge, does this argue against the philosophy or simply that it will often be
unintentionally violated? Again, this may depend upon whether one
wants a philosophy that produces good results when it is internalized
and consciously applied by judges and legislators or simply a normative standard with which to evaluate results. A second distinction is
thus apparent:
2. PNP: The fact that different people in the real world of limited
knowledge may be likely to interpret and apply a given philosophy differently is outside the scope of political philosophy, which is concerned
with the philosophy correctly interpreted and applied. Thus, a defense
of a given political philosophy is not a defense of every judge's or politician's sincere interpretation thereof and may indeed be a criticism of
some predictable interpretations.
APP: The fact that some political philosophies will lead sincere adherents who hold legal and political power to reach conflicting and unpredictable interpretations and applications more frequently than other
philosophies is relevant in deciding among political philosophies, given
the harmful effects of instability and unpredictability as well as the

October 1987)

Political Philosophy and Law

127

harmful effects of the incorrect interpretations and applications
themselves.

Applied political philosophy inquires into the values one would
want legal actors to hold and apply. However, the stability of an initially sincere commitment to a philosophy cannot be assumed; some
institutions may weaken a previously sincere value commitment over
time, or may attract opportunists to positions of power who have no
such sincere commitment. 13 Problems arise if the political philosophy
in question induces its initially sincere adherents to create those institutions which eventually undermine the commitment. Would such a
tendency be an argument against that political philosophy? The answer depends upon the conception of political philosophy's role and is
much the same as before:
3. PNP: Political philosophy does not pass on the truth of the underlying causal hypotheses, so the discipline itself is not charged with calculating the likelihood that the powers which were justified while the
causal claims were true might attract other people to office who would
make such claims even when they were untrue. Such opportunists simply are not following the philosophy, which reflects badly on them, not
the philosophy.
APP: Political philosophy is concerned not only with a first generation
of sincere followers of the philosophy, but also with the question of
whether similarly motivated people will continue to be attracted to the
positions of power that the initially sincere followers created. Other
things equal, a philosophy is better if the positions of power its adherents
will sanction continue to be filled over time by people who accept its
tenets.

Finally, the two conceptions of political philosophy can differ in
their concern for the visibility of abuses of a particular philosophy. If
a court, for example, were abusing its power by making philosophically unjustified or biased decisions, the philosophy in question might
have sufficiently malleable concepts that a plausible opinion disguising
the abuse could be readily produced. As always, pure normative philosophy has no trouble with this problem. The insincere abuse of philosophical concepts cannot discredit the normative ideal itself; it is the
ideal that allows us to call the action an insincere abuse. By contrast,
if one wants to identify a political philosophy that will hold together
an initial commitment by legal and political actors, the ability to institutionally check abuses of a particular philosophy may be of the greatest importance:
4. PNP: The fact that some political philosophies are more susceptible to insincere misuse than others because the violations of the philosophy are easy to camouflage is irrelevant in deciding among philosophies,
13. See F.

HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM

(1944).
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just as a murderer's ability to falsely represent his aggressive act as selfdefense is irrelevant to the morality of killing in genuine self-defense.
Indeed, it is precisely the correct political philosophy that allows us to
condemn the political action as an "insincere misuse."
APP: The visibility of violations of a given philosophy is an important
virtue of the philosophy, since it is an essential precondition to the creation of effective institutional checks on the insincere manipulation of
philosophical concepts.

To summarize the argument thus far, there are at least four reasons why one might expect differences between the philosophies one
would want to serve the pure normative philosophy function and the
applied political philosophy function. The problems of rationalization
and limited knowledge suggest that sincere commitment to and successful application of a philosophy cannot be equated; the problems of
attraction of the insincere and the lack of institutional checks on the
abuse of philosophical concepts suggest that even a sincere commitment may not remain stable.
Of course, the two functions of political philosophy are linked,
since the applied political philosophy ideal seeks to identify values
that, if sincerely held and consistently preserved by legal and political
institutions, would produce "desirable" results. Which results are
"desirable" is presumably a question of pure normative philosophy.
The fact that the two functions are linked, however, does not mean
that they are the same or that the same political philosophy must be
able to serve both functions. Only the most rarified of pure normative
philosophies, in which nothing at all mattered except the Pure Will of
the judge and politician, could make the two functions identical. 14
The closest that political philosophers have come to recognizing
this distinction is the division sometimes drawn between "first best"
and "second best" political principles. 15 "First best" principles correspond roughly with the ideal of pure normative philosophy, while any
factual "imperfections" in the world such as incomplete information
or incentives to misuse power generally are accommodated by more or
less ad hoc modifications of the first best principles. 16 This conceptual
scheme is analytically flawed and misleading. Incomplete information
14. Despite his deontological and Kantian moorings, Rawls himself certainly does not fit this
description. See J. RAWLS, supra note IO, at 30 ("All ethical doctrines worth our attention take
consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational,
crazy.").
I 5. See Philips, Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory. 19 No Os 551
(1985) (indicating the serious difficulties of trying to derive historically appropriate principles
from those that would govern in a first best world).
16. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAi. STATE 234 (1980) ("Secondbest theory does not displace ideal theory; rather, it continues the same conversation, correcting
earlier conclusions only when this can be justified by Neutral argument.") (emphasis in original).
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and diverse incentive structures are not minor appendages upon a first
best vision, but on the contrary are the very essence of legal reality, 17
and no "technology of justice" 18 is likely to remove them from that
central position. As a result, the ideal political philosophy to govern
the values and institutions of legal action is likely to look nothing like
the Goods and Rights defended by normative philosophers, although
complex causal analysis could show the two to be linked. 19
The principal problem with the "second best" designation is conceptual. The ideal applied political philosophy - whatever it may
prove to be - is by definition the very best within its sphere. A judge
or legislator who regarded herself as wise and good enough to disregard its tenets and directly pursue (or create institutions that would
allow her to directly pursue) the first best pure normative philosophy
would be making matters worse; that is the cumulative tendency of the
four identified distinctions. Stated another way, the applied political
philosophy ideal seeks a philosophy that produces good results when
the fallible political human mind consciously interacts with it; it is not
second best because there is no alternative philosophy that could produce better interactions. To personify the ideals, the pure normative
philosophy vision is not directly asking legal actors to believe in it or
act upon it, but to participate in a system that satisfies it, while the
applied political philosophy vision is indeed asking for action-motivating belief. 20 A judge or legislator who took the plausible step of assuming that a first best normative philosophy, to deserve its name,
must be more worthy of action-motivating belief than a second best
applied political philosophy would be committing a category mistake.
That mistake can best be avoided by abandoning the concept of second
best in this context, and acknowledging that there are two separate
spheres of philosophical outlook, each having a particular political
philosophy that is ideal within its sphere.
The remainder of this article seeks to substantiate the thesis that
modern political philosophies suffer from insufficient attention to the
distinction between the two ideals of political philosophy as a discipline. Part II considers the philosophy of the Critical Legal Studies
movement, with particular emphasis upon the writings of Duncan
Kennedy. Part III considers act and rule utilitarianism. Part IV ex17. See, e.g.. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519 (1945).
18. This phrase is employed by Ackerman, B. ACKERMAN, supra note 16, at 21.
19. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 344-45 (arguing that civic virtue and happiness are
best obtained through such "[d]iscreet indirection").
20. The idea of personifying theories to determine whether it is appropriate to say the "goal"
ofa theory is to compel belief in itself is taken from D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 11-12
{1984).
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amines the philosophy of John Rawls and others who have followed
him. Part V treats the libertarian analysis of Robert Nozick. Part VI
concludes that the difficulties these philosophies have encountered are
indeed symptomatic of the broader problem of the two distinct functions that political philosophies have sought to perform.

II.

KENNEDY AND THE CRITICAL LEGAL SCHOLARS

Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is perhaps less of a unified school than
the other philosophies to be examined, and it may therefore be somewhat hazardous to focus attention upon any single individual's
works. 21 Nevertheless, Duncan Kennedy's writings do seem to be representative of the movement on the specific points to be considered
here- the need for altruism, sharing, and the values of community. 22
In any event, the writings of other CLS members are no clearer than
Kennedy's on the relationship between the two distinct functions of
political philosophy.23
Kennedy seeks to contrast the political philosophies of "individualism" and "altruism," arguing that the former improperly dominates
legal discourse at the present time. Kennedy describes these competing
visions as follows:
The essence of individualism is the making of a sharp distinction between one's interests and those of others, combined with the belief that a
preference in conduct for one's own interests is legitimate, but that one
should be willing to respect the rules that make it possible to coexist with
others similarly self-interested. The form of conduct associated with individualism is self-reliance....
The essence of altruism is the belief that one ought not to indulge a
sharp preference for one's own interest over those of others. Altruism
enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be merciful. 24

Kennedy has used these competing ideals to discuss a variety of
21. See, e.g., Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 248-49
(1974) (noting the argument that CLS is too fragmented to constitute a coherent body of thought
but concluding that "enough common elements exist to permit intelligent discussion of the movement as a whole").
22. See id. at 249 (also focussing upon Kennedy's views as representative).
23. The closest I have found to recognition of the distinction is a two-sentence passage in
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 641 (1983):
The higher standard of solidarity - the one that gives primacy to the other party's interests
- is necessarily exceptional. Any attempt to insist upon it in the generality of dealings
would depart so radically from the standards by which people ordinarily deal with each
other that it would merely encourage massive circumvention and hypocrisy coupled with a
stifling despotism of virtue.
And yet even here Unger can be read as seeing the problem of "circumvention and hypocrisy"
only in the attitudes of the regulated, not the regulators.
24. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1713, 1717 (emphasis in original).
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political and legal institutions, 25 including the question of whether a
legal system should be characterized principally by rules or standards.
Preferring the altruistic vision of standards, Kennedy argues that his
casual conversations on the issue have indicated that the proponents of
rules and standards possess fundamentally different values. Specifically, he offers the following catalog of the value terms most frequently employed by proponents of rules and standards:26
Rules
[A:]

Good

Neutrality
Uniformity
Precision
Certainty
Autonomy
Rights
Privacy
Efficiency
Order
Exactingness
Self-reliance
Boundaries
Stability
Security

Standards
[B:]

Bad

Rigidity
Conformity
Anality
Compulsiveness
Alienation
Vested Interests
Isolation
Indifference
Reaction
Punitiveness
Stinginess
Walls
Sclerosis
Threatenedness

[C:]

Bad

Bias
Favoritism
Sloppiness
Uncertainty
Totalitarianism
Tyranny
Intrusiveness
Sentimentality
Chaos
Permissiveness
Romanticism
Invasion
Disintegration
Dependence

[D:]

Good

Flexibility
Individualization
Creativity
Spontaneity
Participation
Community
Concern
Equity
Evolution
Tolerance
Generosity
Empathy
Progress
Trust

This fascinating value chart deserves careful consideration in light
of the categories identified in this article. For example, it is interesting
to compare Columns A and D as if they both purported to be comprehensive pure normative philosophies, i.e., the highest first best values
of the normative universe. It seems clear that Column A would depict
a deeply impoverished world, and that Column D, whatever its defects, would be far preferable. Kennedy struggles to consider how individualism and rules could strike anyone as plausible rather than as
"absurd or obviously evil." 27 This language strongly suggests that
Kennedy is indeed comparing Columns A and D as pure normative
philosophy, where Column A, if it purported to be complete, would
fully deserve Kennedy's description.
25. For example, Kennedy criticizes the ideal of freedom of contract from an altruistic perspective, arguing that judges who refuse to enforce unfair contracts are "at work on the indispensable task of imagining an altruistic order." Id. at 1778.
26. Id. at 1710.
27. See id. at 1746 ("It is not easy to reconstruct the Classical individualist economic vision,
especially if we want to understand it from the inside as plausible, rather than absurd or obviously evil.").

132

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:123

As for the "vice words" 28 in Columns B and C, the striking feature
of these terms is the difference in the settings in which one would be
likely to hear most of the words. Although some of the terms in Column B are obviously governmental, many of the terms seem to fit
more plausibly as a list of human traits that might undermine the ability of an individual or small group to be spontaneous, loving, trusting
friends. Column D appears to be roughly the opposite of Column B,
with many of its terms clearly constituting values that would further
such close relationships. By contrast, Column C seems to resonate
with distrust of strangers - people with excessive confidence in their
own objectivity and images of the world, described by Brandeis as
"men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." 29 Similarly,
Column A represents the kinds of moral values one would probably
hear in an individual citizen's defense against the men of zeal.
If these Gestalt-like reactions to Kennedy's chart are widely
shared, they appear to suggest a paradoxical feature of moral intuitions. The set of values that strike us as plausible candidates for first
best pure normative philosophy (Column D) are also the values one
would like to see among the small or intimate group. Nevertheless,
one preserves a set of values that are distinctly inferior as pure normative philosophy (Column A) as a defense against the "men of zeal"
who, "without understanding," seek the political promotion of their
own interpretation of Column D. One also preserves two sets of vice
terms, one for those traits that directly deprive us of the possibility of
the first best small group ideals (Column B) and another for those
traits that threaten to invoke unreliable political institutions in an effort to bring those ideals about (Column C).
The philosopher who has seen these paradoxes most clearly is
Friedrich Hayek. According to Hayek, societal evolution has produced a set of large-scale institutions that proved capable of preserving
life, but the values that sustain those institutions are not the values of
the small group. 30 In Hayek's view, this is particularly insidious because human beings have evolved biologically for literally millions of
years in small hunter-and-gatherer groups, and are, therefore, proba28. See generally Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion" -

Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985

DUKE L.J. 541.

29. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30. See F. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 90 (1976):
In the small group the individual can know the effects of his actions on his several fellows,
and the rules may effectively forbid him to harm them in any manner and even require him
to assist them in specific ways. In the Great Society many of the effects ofa person's actions
on various fellows must be unknown to him. It can, therefore, not be the specific effects in
the particular case, but only rules which define kinds of actions as prohibited or required,
which must serve as guides to the individual.
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bly genetically predisposed to embrace such small group values and to
resist the restraints of the open society. 31 And even if this sociobiological thesis is incorrect, it is undoubtedly the case that most people
developed their values among small groups of family and friends, and
therefore may be predisposed to apply those values of sharing and sacrifice when they consider political questions. 32
Of course there is no reason in the abstract why the things one
most values in the small group could not serve as first principles to
govern the institutions of political society. But Hayek's writings stand
as a warning of the causal consequences of doing so. He suggests that
the deliberate pursuit of small group values by the larger society ironically would frustrate the spontaneous societal order necessarily presupposed by small groups in their own goals. 33 In the language of this
article, Kennedy's Columns A and Care the virtue and vice terms at the
level of applied political philosophy, while Columns Band Dare the vice
and virtue terms at the level of pure normative philosophy. If Hayek's
causal thesis is correct, Kennedy is committing a category mistake
when he concludes that Columns B and D, because they are intuitively
more compelling, should therefore be enshrined in the values and institutions of political society. 34
To summarize the argument, one who tries to apply normative first
principles directly to political institutions will undoubtedly find "absurd or obviously evil" a political system with "neutrality" and
"rights" as its highest governing maxims. 35 Any sensible normative
philosophy would place many values higher than these, especially the
values of community, and most of the rest of Kennedy's Column D.
But as Robert Nozick, whose philosophy is itself criticized in Part IV
of this article, has quite correctly observed, "Utopia is not just a society in which the [neutral, rights-based] framework is realized.... We
live in particular communities. It is here that one's nonimperialistic
vision of the ideal or good society is to be propounded and realized.
Allowing us to do that is what the framework is for. " 36 Allowing us to
31. See E. Bun.ER, HAYEK: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
THOUGHT OF OUR TIME 37 (1983) ("In a sense, man was civilised against his wishes. The old
morality was deeply embedded in human instincts as a result of the hundreds of millenia which
men spent in tribal groups.").

32. Cf id. at 33-34.
33. See id. at 34-36.
34. See e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1719 (arguing that an altruist would view law·s effect
upon the previously wicked man as one that "provides him a conscience").
35. See id. at 1715 (arguing that individualism responds to "the political rhetoric of free will.
autonomy, and natural rights"').
36. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 332 (emphasis in original).
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pursue Column D is what the "applied political philosophy" Columns
A and Care for.
Does this framework really require rules rather than standards? 37
Many who have had a thorough exposure to American legal education
will doubt this claim. And it is undoubtedly this shared skepticism
about the possibility or desirability of rigid rules that Kennedy is seeking to tap in order to enlist support for CLS "altruistic" political philosophy. The views one develops about rules versus standards from
reviewing legal materials, and especially standard casebooks, are intuitions that can mislead; a broader view shows how completely Western
society is and ought to be dependent upon rigid rules. Consider any
standard casebook illustration. 38 It is likely to seem that the judge
could justify accepting either the plaintiff's or the defendant's argument; the rule does not unambiguously determine the result and some
resort to vaguer standards may be necessary. Four considerations suggest, however, that this perspective on the question of rules and standards is misleading. First, the parties to the case are perhaps two or
three out of billions of people on earth; almost all of the rest, if they
had appeared in the case, would have had their claim resolved by a flat
rule. Second, the positions taken by the plaintiff and defendant are
only two of an almost infinite number of theoretically possible results
of the case; the ovenvhelming bulk of possible outcomes would be
barred by a flat rule. Third, casebook illustrations are but a tiny percentage of the cases that arise, and they are studied because they
seemed to the parties to have legal issues worth appealing and to the
casebook authors to present interesting legal questions. Fourth, the
legal system as a whole tends to operate when rights are in dispute; in
the bulk of social situations, the rules are sufficiently clear that no one
seriously contemplates a lawsuit. Thus, while dependence of legal education upon standard casebook illustrations has many virtues, it is
37. Hayek of course has argued that the rule of law is central to a liberal society, although
standards to handle hard cases are inevitable. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 32:
Complete certainty of the law is, of course, an ideal which we can never attain, since we arc
constantly refining the verbal formulations of law which we make in our continuing at·
tempts to discover the rules of true justice. These formulations, however, must always be
consistent with accepted notions of the 'sense of justice· and thus make it possible to predict
with some accuracy the outcome of any court case in which they are tested ....
The rule of law therefore ensures that decisions are made according to known and gen·
eral rules and not according to the apparent desirability of particular outcomes.
38. "Any" illustration is no doubt an overstatement; some, perhaps many, standard casebook
illustrations are resolvable by flat rules. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 24 ("Yet through all
the doctrinal murkiness, the settled legal rules make perfectly clear, more than 99.9 percent of
the time, who, if anyone, possesses and owns anything."). This article does not take a position on
how many of the cases law students deal with are truly "hard cases"; the point of the discussion
in the text is to place the entire enterprise in a larger context.
·
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worth asking what subliminal message about political philosophy, including the rules versus standards debate, it is creating in those who
experience such an education.
In many respects, the political philosophy of CLS is simply sad
because, if implemented, it would produce not only unintended consequences, but consequences directly opposite to those intended. Kennedy hopes that altruism and empathy will be encouraged by political
actors who set aside rigid entitlements to enforce concrete, shared
community values. 39 Roberto Unger hopes that a spiral of increasing
community will progressively improve human beings in their desire to
fulfill their nature. 40 But these claims entail/actual as well as normative views, and the unproven character of such factual assertions at the
applied political philosophy level is concealed by including them
within a political philosophy that clearly purports to be a normative
theory of first principles. 41
Now it may be the case that most people would prefer to see a
public commitment to concrete economic justice rather than to abstract entitlements, i.e., to a world in which those who have more than
they socially deserve will share and be altruistic with those who have
less than they socially deserve. The problem, however, is that they are
likely to favor such a goal for different and often contradictory reasons,42 each economic group believing that the trait in which it excels
is most socially relevant. 43 Most people probably believe that they are
entitled to their current income and, if true social justice prevailed, to
a fair amount more as well. 44 Most individuals would be violently
39. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
40. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 239 (1975) ("[B]oth human nature and our
understanding of it can progress through a spiral of increasing community and diminishing
domination.").
41. See generally Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1710 ("The different values that people commonly associate with the formal modes of rule and standard are conveyed by the emotive or
judgmental words that the advocates of the two positions use in the course of debate about a
particular issue.").
42. See F. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POl.ITICS AND ECONOMICS 242-43 (1967)
("[T]he word 'social' presupposes the existence of known and common aims behind the activities
of a community, but does 1101 define them.") (emphasis in original).
43. See F. HAYEK, supra note 30, at 77-78:
[W]hen we ask what ought to be the relative remunerations of a nurse and a butcher, of a_
coal miner and a judge at a high court, of the deep sea diver or the cleaner of sewers, of the
organizer ofa new industry and a jockey, of the inspector of taxes and the inventor ofa lifesaving drug, of the jet pilot or the professor of mathematics, the appeal to "social justice"
does not give us the slightest help in deciding ....
44. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 95:
Once a government takes upon itself the task of redistributing incomes on the basis of some
measure of merit or "social justice" ... [a]ll will claim that their efforts are more meritorious than others, and that their share should be increased. Because there are no agreed rules
which help to decide who should get what, the decisions of the government will be arbitrary
and unpredictable.
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incensed if some altruistic planner told them that their income must be
reduced by forty percent because, after the planner's empathy for all
was balanced, their position in the community made them worth only
that lower figure.
The problem is evident enough; there may be a shared desire for
concrete as opposed to abstract economic fairness, but the perceptions
of concrete fairness held by individuals are incompatible with even the
present amount of wealth, much less with the far smaller pie that
would be available under such a scheme. 45 No group will believe that
an honest and impartial judge could assess their fundamental worth
within the community very far from where they themselves place it,
with the result that almost everyorze will come to believe the government
must be partial toward someone else. Groups would respond to an adverse assessment by accelerating their political activity to correct an
obvious (to them) injustice, but this acceleration would only lead to
further decreases in overall income46 and more extreme anger at both
the unjust system and their enemies' competing conceptions of concrete justice. 47
The essential problem is that concrete economic or social justice is
a "mirage"48 produced by each individual's correct view that the political authorities have the power to eliminate for any given individual
any scarcity barrier between that individual's income and her conception of her own worth. It is a mirage because the government does not
have that power for all individuals taken together. 49 That is especially
true when one considers that a public declaration that henceforth the
government will not respect abstract rights but will promote concrete
economic fairness would significantly increase expectations, because
each group would feel sincerely that concrete fairness would more
generously reward its own best trait. so
It is not obvious where this scenario - community infighting over
affirmation of fundamentals by individuals enraged by their relative
shares of a declining pie - would end. Certainly it would not end
45. See F. HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 150 (1979) ("Once politics
becomes a tug-of-war for shares in the income pie, decent government is impossible."),
46. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 97-102.
47. The governmental paralysis at this point is likely to inspire a demand for "strong leader·
ship," and in a society in which power means so much, true socialists wilt be deterred by their
principles to do what it takes to obtain power, leaving the worst on top. Hayek's analysis of this
dynamic remains one of the best. See F. HAYEK, supra note 13, at 134-52.
48. See note 30 supra.
49. See F. HAYEK, supra note 45, at 103 ("[I]t soon ceases to be the 'deserts' but becomes
exclusively the 'political necessity' which determines which groups are to be favoured at general
expense.").
50. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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with agreement as to the "community good"; in fact, it is difficult to
see how the poisonous public discourse of groups denying each other's
public claims to worth and wealth could keep from accelerating in a
declining and politicized society. 51 With most convinced that the government must be partial to someone else in order to explain a public
declaration that their concrete worth in the community is so different
from their own self-perception, scapegoating might be the only shared
desire remaining. s2
It is probably inevitable that the wealth wanted by all individuals
in any society, added together, will total more than the wealth available. But a society is far healthier when the wealth that all individuals
believe they must be given, added together, is only 105 percent of the
available wealth rather than 405 percent. 53 Of course, none of this is
to say that the government should not help those in society who cannot help themselves; the wealthy may complain, but justice is worth
certain costs in disharmony. Nevertheless, there is simply no parallel
between modest sacrifices demanded to help the poor and a system
that chooses to make the whole society serve a concrete communitarian end over which everyone must fight to dominate or be dominated.
The last trait such a system would further is human empathy.
This pessimistic scenario certainly has not been proven conclusively, and perhaps some modest communitarian values would not
generate anything like such a reverse spiral of negative sentiment. The
point is, however, that CLS has chosen to embrace a political philosophy that does not take factual scenarios of this nature seriously, but
contents itself with the obvious normative point that rights and neutrality cannot be the highest moral values. 54 Obvious normative
points are not enough to satisfy the demands of an applied political
philosophy. In order to be persuasive, CLS representatives must advance a causal thesis that political actors who consciously seek to require "altruism" and the "community good" will actually have that
effect in a world of unintended consequences.
51. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 81 (discussing the inherent "conflicts when the valuations of the planners disagree with the valuations which people have of themselves").
52. As Hayek notes, the easiest shared concrete end is usually a negative one, such as a
virulent nationalism or shared hatred of an ethnic minority. See F. HAYEK, supra note 13, at
139.
53. See E. BUTLER, supra note 31, at 80 (arguing that the perceived unfairness of one's income can be more easily borne "[w]here the hazards of skill and luck and impersonal market
forces determine income" than where incomes are perceived to be the product of a consciously
planned decision).
54. See notes 34-35 & 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
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ACT AND RULE UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism nicely illustrates the confusion generated by the attempt to use the same political philosophy to serve both the pure normative philosophy and applied political philosophy functions.
Abstracting from complexities of the doctrine not pertinent here, utilitarianism as a pure normative philosophy asserts that the ideal state of
affairs is one which maximizes happiness.ss Utilitarians are often
pressed to justify their view in the face of hypotheticals such as: "Suppose many people derived tremendous pleasure from watching the suffering of a few. Would you nevertheless affirm the value of maximum
happiness?"S 6
The purpose of this article is not to assess whether utilitarianism
can be defended in the face of this and other hypotheticals. The point
is rather that this is a perfectly proper question to ask from the perspective of pure normative philosophy. Moreover, the common utilitarian attempts to escape such dilemmas by "changing the
hypothetical" must be rejected as illegitimate. For example, utilitarians might object that "people could not derive enough pleasure to outweigh the suffering" or "a system that allowed such spectacles of
cruelty would be uncontrollable and would eventually generate net
disutility."s 7 These responses are simply irrelevant from the perspective of normative philosophy. The question can simply be rephrased:
"Would you favor such spectacles of suffering if they did maximize
happiness and if they would not be uncontrollable?" Pure normative
philosophy should in principle be able to answer this question even if
this state of affairs could never obtain in the real world. ss
55. See Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST I (1973) [hereinafter UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST]. One of the key complexities is whether the ideal state of affairs is one that maximizes
average utility or total utility. The two theories differ when issues of population size are treated
as variable, i.e., should one seek to increase the size of the population to increase total utility even
if average utility is decreased? Smart appears to favor the classical utilitarian position of maxi·
mizing total utility. Id. at 27-28.
56. See Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST,
supra note 55, at 105 (utilitarianism might sanction persecution of intensely hated minorities).
57. See, e.g., Smart, supra note 55, at 70-71 (responding to a similar hypothetical by saying
"[l]et us hope that this is a logical possibility and not a factual one").
58. It has been persuasively argued that our moral institutions have evolved to enable us to
handle the kinds of facts that are actually likely to arise, rather than bizarre counterfactual hypotheticals. See Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND
supra note 11, at 23, 30-36. Some anti-utilitarian hypothetical cases are not so clearly bizarre,
however, and the possibility must be entertained that it is the maximum utility principle that hns
evolved because in our actual world its implications are not too bad. In any event, the epistemological difficulty of knowing the proper principles to govern in counterfactual worlds docs not
mean that there are no such principles, and since many worlds once believed to be counterfactual
have become real, it is better to have some moral beliefs about counterfactual cases rather than
none.
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Since this point is plausible enough, why might a utilitarian nevertheless consider her response legitimate? The answer seems to be that
she has in mind the conscious implementation of utilitarian principles
by the legal process, and she wants to argue that such a deliberate
policy would not produce unfortunate spectacles. 59 In other words,
the utilitarian is responding to a critique of the utilitarian doctrine's
ability to serve as a pure normative philosophy by asserting its ability
to serve the separate applied political philosophy function. The problem is that this shift is nowhere acknowledged. Of course it is true
that in designing legal institutions one can safely neglect consequences
that could not occur in the real world. But notice two effects of the
utilitarian's grasping for a utilitarian applied political philosophy as an
argument that also purports to defend utilitarianism as a normative
philosophy. The first effect is that the normative philosopher is now
philosophically predisposed to accept certain causal theses and to reject
others, i.e., to prefer the thesis that public spectacles cannot maximize
utility. The second effect is to leave a gap in the normative system, so
that if it should prove to be true that spectacles of suffering do increase
utility, one has said nothing to oppose or support such spectacles.
Stated another way, attempting to answer arguments addressed at
the pure normative philosophy level with responses at the applied
political philosophy level tends to warp or artificially distort both factual inquiry and normative philosophy. It distorts factual inquiry by
predisposing people to prefer one factual thesis over another for normative reasons, a practice with deleterious consequences sufficiently
clear that the Lysenko experience should suffice as a warning. 60 It also
tends to distort normative philosophy by arguing that since certain
states of the world are not possible, there is no need to construct a
normative philosophy that evaluates their relative desirability.
Suppose, however, that the utilitarian does not take this step, but
chooses to defend public utility-maximizing spectacles. Again, the
question here is not whether this response is correct as a matter of
normative philosophy; it is at least working consistently within the
same discipline. The utilitarian may now be asked whether she is an
"act utilitarian," arguing that each actor should seek to maximize utility with each act, or a "rule utilitarian" who argues that actors should
59. See id. at 30 ('"[T]hat no actual Nazis had such intense desires [to outweigh the harm
they caused] is, I think, obvious .... ") (emphasis in original).
60. I have discussed the problem of value predispositions to accept factual propositions in
Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 696·709 (1986) (So·
viet geneticist Lysenko's erroneous scientific theories were widely accepted in the Soviet Union
long after they had been rejected by the scientific community elsewhere because the theories were
in agreement with Stalin's Marxist ideology.)
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comply with rules and that rulemakers should seek to maximize
utility. 61
The problem here is that the utilitarian is being asked to step out of
normative philosophy into applied political philosophy. As a normative philosophy, utilitarianism praises a state of affairs and says nothing directly about maxims of conduct that individual actors or
rulemakers should personally embrace. Perhaps if each actor tried to
maximize utility as she saw it with each act, total utility would be less
than if each actor had a different motivation. 62 It might also be true
that if each rulemaker tried to maximize utility as she saw it, and other
actors complied with such rules, total utility would be less than if the
rulemaker and/or the rule followers had a different motivation.
These problems are inevitable when normative philosophy seeks to
pronounce that judges and legislators ought to consciously follow a
conduct rule without any attempt to identify scientifically the actual
consequences that might follow. 63 However, whether the unintended
consequences of converting a normative philosophy into an applied
political philosophy are mere matters of second best housekeeping or
whether they fundamentally warp the political philosophy in question
depends upon just what those consequences are.
In the case of utilitarianism as an applied political philosophy, the
neglected consequences indeed seem to be grave. While an enormous
amount has been written against utilitarian political philosophy, by
and large the critique has been wide of the mark. The criticism typically focuses upon the legitimate problems of utilitarianism as a normative philosophy, i.e., that restrictions on the liberty of a hated
minority might increase total happiness. As a practical matter in
political theory, these anomalies in utilitarianism as a normative philosophy seem relatively minor. Trampling important civil liberties
rarely satisfies the maximum happiness criterion; 64 German society
under Hitler was not a joyful one. Of course, to whatever extent utili61. For a defense of rule utilitarianism, see Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism, Equality and Jus·
tice, 2 Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 115 (1985).
62. See id. at 127 ("[R]ule utilitarianism will yield a higher level of social utility [than net
utilitarianism] because it requires wider respect for other people's rights and for our own special
obligations.").
63. See D. PARFIT, supra note 20, at 45-49 (arguing that a consequentialist could consider
acting morally to be a good in itself).
64. See Goldman, Rawls and Utilitarianism. in SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note I, at 360 ("[A]t
least if Rawls' own empirical assumptions are true ... the contrast between utiliturianism und
Rawls' principles of justice with respect to treatment of basic liberties is for less dramatic than
much of Rawls' discussion would suggest."). On the ideu of the indirect pursuit of utility
through respecting liberty, see Gray, Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights. 1 Soc. PHii.. &
POl.Y. 73 (1984).
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tarianism is defective as a normative philosophy, a political system
that satisfied its tenets would make some improper decisions. But a
society that actually adopted every policy that truly maximized happiness would probably be such a delightful society that people today
could not begin to imagine it; the few philosophically mistaken policies
probably would be seen as a trivial price to pay for such a society.
This of course does not justify the philosophical mistakes; it simply
suggests that the critique of utilitarianism as an applied political philosophy should not focus primarily upon its legitimate defects as a
normative philosophy.
Rather, the principal defects with utilitarianism as an applied
political philosophy relate to the structural differences between the
two ideals of political philosophy identified in Part I. A governing
body might be instructed to satisfy the maximum utility goal. But
would such a body actually satisfy the goal? The temptation to pass
special interest legislation and rationalize it as being utility-maximizing is clear enough. Utilitarianism in itself does not make any class of
actions categorically wrong; everything depends upon one's guess
about the effects of a policy upon the psychic state of millions of individuals. 65 The guess a political actor makes will be heavily influenced
by the information and incentive structure facing her. Public choice
theory 66 documents the fact that the information reaching legislators
is starkly distorted; subtleties of detail are lost in statistical aggregates, 67 and concentrated interests lobby heroically. 68 As for incentives, the democratic process creates an incentive to pass a continuous
stream of laws with visible, concentrated benefits and invisible, diffuse
harms. 69 And of course without such democratic checks human actors are likely to have their own set of differential sympathies, 70
whether as a result of their biological nature71 or their socialization. 72
Without a sense that certain kinds of actions are per se improper, i.e.,
65. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
66. The pioneering work of this discipline is Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
67. See D. LAVOIE, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING: WHAT Is LEFT? 104 (1985)
("Armed only with these aggregative models of the economy, it is hardly surprising that government policy has been completely impotent in the face of the severe and worsening problems of
the contemporary world.").
68. See Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, II HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 91, 107-08 (1983).
69. Id. at 100-11.
70. See D. FREEDMAN, HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY: A HOLISTIC APPROACH (1979).
71. Id. For a critique of these sociobiological claims for a biological basis behind human
action, see P. KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN
NATURE {1985).
72. There is considerable literature on the question of reference groups and their effect on the
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without any sense that individuals have certain categorical rights, it
would take an almost superhuman person to keep her guess about utility effects from being influenced by these persistent pressures. And
since different legislators will assess the imponderable of the utility
calculation differently, uncertain and unpredictable legislation will
surely be the rule.
These abstract difficulties have assumed tangible form in the area
of constitutional law, particularly in the sphere of economic liberties.
For many years, the Supreme Court took the position that legislation
could be invalidated under the due process clause if it unreasonably
limited freedom of contracting by private parties. This approach led
of course to decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 73 invalidating
maximum hours legislation for bakers, that numerous commentators
attacked as shielding the oppression of the poor. 74 Since the New
Deal, the Court has indicated that legislatures have essentially free
rein to pass economic regulations enhancing the utility of society,
uninhibited by notions of liberty of contract. 75
Unfortunately, contemporary experience with the unleashing of an
applied political philosophy of utilitarianism in economic affairs, unconstrained by alternative conceptions of economic liberties, has been
quite sobering. In numerous cases, legislators apparently convinced
themselves that statutes conferring the narrowest of special interest
privileges - for optometrists, 76 attorneys, 77 and other occupational
groups78 - promoted the general welfare. Despite the restrictions on
occupational and contractual freedom that these statutes entailed, the
Court felt obliged to defer, adding the faint hope that isolated and
diffuse consumers and would-be producers had an adequate remedy
through the political process. 79 Utilitarianism in economic affairs has
thus served to unleash a negative sum game of perpetual rent seeking,
a process that ironically has in all probability significantly reduced aggregate utility. 80 Some due process limitation on the applied political
formation and alteration of attitudes. For a review of that literature, see M. SMITH, PERSUASION
AND HUMAN ACTION 164-90 (1982).
73. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74. See, e.g., Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 280-85 (1973); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
14-15 (1980).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
76. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
77. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
78. The problems were presaged in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
79. See, e.g., Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 486-88; Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 728-33.
80. See, e.g., Rottenberg, Introduction, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION I,
6-9 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980).
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philosophy of utilitarianism may be necessary to promote utility after
all.
IV.

RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE

Professor John Rawls' famous theory of justice expressly seeks to
improve upon utilitarianism.s 1 What is not at all clear is whether
Rawls perceives the problem to be with utilitarianism as a normative
philosophy or as an applied political philosophy, or even that he perceives the two to be distinct. His well-known conclusion is that the
proper moral principles to govern the basic structures2 of society are
those that people would choose behind a veil of ignorance concerning
their own particular interests and conceptions of the Good. He argues
that such depersonalized contractors would choose to secure equal liberties and to permit only those economic and social inequalities that
would operate to the benefit of the least well-off, by providing the better-off with necessary incentives. s3 Rawls argues that the parties in
the original position would not seek to maximize utility, but would
instead acknowledge that every person possesses an inviolability based
on justice that not even the welfare of the society as a whole can
override. s4
There is no question that Rawls successfully taps many of the
moral intuitions of modern man, and his accomplishments at the pure
normative philosophy level cannot be denied. The religious dissident
or racial minority group member does seem entitled to moral protection even against the occasional act of persecution that does maximize
utility.ss The person born blind and handicapped does seem entitled
to coerced transfer payments from the more fortunate without regard
to any utilitarian calculus. s6 Moreover, the reason for these intuitions
81. J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 14.
82. Rawls says that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice, and he
defines the basic structure as "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. By
major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social
arrangements." Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 60-61.
84. Id. at 167-92.
85. Actually, Rawls continues to make the liberties of these individuals contingent upon empirical facts, since the liberties are to be protected only if, given knowledge of the general facts of
society, the parties in the original position would choose them. Id. at 159-60. However, it does
seem plausible that individuals who wanted to make a compact they could willingly keep would
see to it that these liberties were protected.
86. Obviously, the description of the individual as "blind and handicapped" is intended to
distinguish this intuition from the case of an individual who is poor as a result of personal choices
- leisure over work, spending over savings, etc. - where the moral problems are much harder.
Clearly, these choices are heavily influenced in fact by the general culture in which the individual
is raised, and it is hard to expect people to transcend their environment readily. On the other
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does seem to be a sense that "there but for the Grace of God go I" and
that we ought not to exploit unfairly our good fortune in life's lottery.
On the other hand, it appears at times that Rawls is seeking to
develop his own applied political philosophy that will improve upon
utilitarian applied political philosophy. Unfortunately, Rawls seems
no more aware than the utilitarians that the two functions of political
philosophy are distinct, and that only a remarkable coincidence could
make the same philosophy ideal for each function. Instead, Rawls'
book oscillates confusingly between the pure normative philosophy
and the applied political philosophy functions - a confusion with detrimental effects on both disciplines.
The first example of this confusion is Rawls' emphasis upon the
stability of his conception. s7 Rawls is disturbed by the fact that utilitarianism is willing to justify extreme unhappiness for some by arguments about the average or aggregate happiness.ss For Rawls, this
conception is unstable because people are separate beings; the worstoff cannot be expected to have such complete empathy for their fellow
human beings that they will see their utilitarian society as optimally
just. s9 And Rawls clearly wants a philosophy that all people can bring
themselves to accept and act upon, a philosophy that expresses their
nature as free and equal moral beings.9°
Is Rawls' "stability" argument made at the level of pure normative
philosophy or at the level of applied political philosophy? Rawls
clearly defends a basic structure of society that will consciously seek to
maximize the "primary goods" of the class of society with the smallest
quantum of such goods. 91 "Primary goods" are things that people
hand, personal responsibility for these choices may be the only way to change that culture over
the long run.
Rawls himself does not draw this distinction sharply, noting: "The assertion that a man
deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is ..•
problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit." Id. at 104. On the other hand, Dworkin stresses the
distinction between wealth differences that flow from differences in personal choices and wealth
differences that flow from differences in innate ability or initial entitlements. R. DWORKIN, Why
Liberals Should Care About Equality, in A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 205.
87. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 496-504.
88. Id. at 500.
89. See id.:
It is evident why the utilitarian stresses the capacity for sympathy. Those who do not benefit from the better situation of others must identify with the greater sum (or average) of
satisfaction else they will not desire to follow the utility criterion. . • . [A] marked capacity
for sympathetic identification seems relatively rare.
90. See id. at 251-57, 587 (presenting this Kantian conception of the original position and
suggesting that its adoption by each person demonstrates that person's "purity of heart").
91. See id. at 95 ("On this conception of social justice, then, expectations are defined as the
index of primary goods that a representative man can reasonably look forward to. A person's
prospects are improved when he can anticipate a preferred collection of these goods.").
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presumably want no matter what concrete ends they have; liberty and
income are examples. 92 The bottom representative person thus has a
moral "lien" of sorts on everyone above her; the proceeds of the activities of all belong as of right to the bottom person except those proceeds
which are necessary to induce the activities themselves. 93 Is Rawls
offering a political thesis, that such a structure of society will indeed be
stable and capable of generating its own support? Or is he offering a
metaethical thesis, that a philosophy which some people cannot bring
themselves to accept is for that reason an objectionable normative
philosophy?
The truth seems to be that Rawls is making both the political and
metaethical claims. 94 But surely this attempt to ride two horses cannot succeed. At the metaethical level, Rawls wants a pure normative
philosophy that one hundred percent of the citizenry theoretically
ought to be able to bring themselves to accept. In order to accomplish
this goal, however, Rawls is forced to construct a philosophy that requires extraordinary good will of the majority; individuals in the majority are urged that on issues of society's structure they ought to
forget entirely who they are and what they have. 95 The majority is
also told that justice requires that the position of the worst-off representative person be maximized without any regard to the effect of such
actions on the total wealth or total utility of the majority. 96
Rawls notes the central importance of stability in political institutions, but his stability analysis is concerned with the need to avoid
crime, civil disturbances, and other problems that arise when small
groups are disaffected from the dominant philosophy and choose not
to obey it. 97 As a result, Rawls misses the critical significance of securing a stable commitment to a philosophy (or its results) from the
majority, since without their reliable assent the philosophy cannot be
implemented through legitimate institutions. Rawls' philosophy is
starkly countermajoritarian in urging that everything possible must be
done to maximize the position of the worst-off class at any cost before
the majority can pay any attention to its own interests. This is quite a
92. Rawls lists as primary goods "the bases of self-respect" as well as "rights and liberties,
powers and opportunities, income and wealth." These are goods that "normally have a use
whatever a person's rational plan of life." Id. at 62.
93. For a similar characterization of Rawls' position, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 341.
94. For a view that Rawls embraces the metaethical claim, see D. PARFIT, supra note 20, at
43. On the other hand, Rawls stresses that the lack of stability caused by inconsistency between
one's conception of the Good and the public definition of the Right would mean that "penal
devices will play a much larger role in the social system." J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 576.
95. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 136-42.
96. See id. at 152-57.
97. See id. at 240-41.

146

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:123

different thing from urging a majority to incur modest sacrifices for a
minority or to respect "minority" rights that might benefit any one of
their number at a later time.
At the applied political philosophy level, the problem is not that
Rawls' philosophy might fall on deaf ears. Rather, the problem is that
the predictable majoritarian hostility to a starkly countermajoritarian
philosophy is quite likely to lead those who are persuaded by that philosophy to conclude that majoritarian institutions themselves have lost
some of their philosophical legitimacy and may be inherently unjust.
If long experience shows that majorities simply will not make decisions without regard to their own interests, the attractiveness of alternative institutions such as the courts that do not depend upon
majoritarian consent is certain to increase. 98 Predictably, numerous
commentators have proposed precisely this constitutional role for the
judiciary, i.e., the protection of values that are so important that they
cannot be left to the valuations of elected majorities. A leading example is Professor Michelman's argument that courts should secure affirmative claims for the poor under the fourteenth amendment, a
position he defends on explicitly Rawlsian grounds. 99
The problem once again comes in the transition from a pure normative philosophy to direct legal applications. Through what institutional process are these sharply countermajoritarian normative ideals
to be implemented? Constitutions are drafted and amended through
majoritarian or even supermajoritarian processes. Once drafted, of
course, constitutions can be interpreted in countermajoritarian ways,
making it possible to implement certain ideals to which the drafting
majorities might not have assented. The problem, however, is that the
interpreting judiciary tends to lack effective feedback to force judges to
reconsider their mistakes; the natural human tendency to imagine that
most of one's prior actions produced good results is unchecked. 100
98. Numerous legal commentators sympathetic to Rawls have proposed precisely such a role
for the courts. See. e.g., Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14-16 (1969) (relying upon Rawls' theory of justice as fairne~s
as articulated in journal articles that preceded Rawls' book). For a view that the Court should
identify and protect widely shared ideals, see Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment 011
the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1216-19 (1978). Dworkin's view is that the very idea of regarding a constitution as binding presupposes a prior commitment to pre-political rights which courts properly consider in interpreting the constitutional text.
See R. DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 33, 3438.
99. Michelman, supra note 98, at 13-16.
JOO. See T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 39 (1980):
Where political decision making is broadly defined to include judicial decision making, feedback from those affected is even less effective. Moreover, the cost of a court's monitoring
the consequences of its own decisions could easily be prohibitive, and especially where the
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Over time, the opportunity to rationalize the temptations of power
with the guide to "adopt policies people would favor if they ·did not
know who they were" would be almost as great as that under utilitarianism. The poor are undoubtedly the intended beneficiaries of academic versions of Rawlsian judging, but in a world of unintended
consequences they need not be its actual beneficiaries.
In addition to Rawls' position on the stability issue, there is a second important feature of his theory where an ambiguity arises between
the pure normative philosophy and the applied political philosophy
visions. Rawls states that other things being equal, a principle is to be
preferred if it is simple and if its lexical position with respect to other
principles is clear. 101 As one such instance, Rawls holds that at least
in modem Western societies, no violation of equal liberties can be justified by any socioeconomic gain for the poor (or the nonpoor). 102 Is
this argument made at the level of pure normative philosophy or at the
level of applied political philosophy?
The answer again appears to be that Rawls wants the same ideas to
serve both functions, 103 and again such an attempt to ride two horses
is problematic. Indeed, at the level of pure normative philosophy, it is
not at all clear that first best moral principles would be either simple
or lexically ordered. 104 What is the lexical ordering of truth, love,
friendship, beauty, autonomy, average human welfare, total human
welfare, animal welfare, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, equality of political power, and satisfaction of basic needs? Even if some of these values seem intuitively much more
important than others, it would not follow that every increment of improvement in the preferred value would be more important than any
possible improvement in the lesser value. 105 As one example, it seems
unlikely that many nonintellectuals would regard every increment of
consequences include effects on people not party to the legal action, but whose whole constellation of expectations have been changed.
101. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 320-21.
102. Id. at 542-43:
Now the basis for the priority ofliberty is roughly as follows: as the conditions of civilization improve, the marginal significance for our good of further economic and social advantages diminishes relative to the interests of liberty, which became stronger as the
conditions for the exercise of the equal freedoms are more fully realized. Beyond some point
it becomes and then remains irrational from the standpoint of the original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means and amenities of office.
103. See, e.g., id. at 324 (competing principles are ultimately less clear for ethical reasons).
104. See Alexander & Schwarzschild, Liberalism, Neutrality, and Equality of Welfare vs.
Equality of Resources, 16 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 85 (1987) (arguing for such a plural conception of
the Good).
105. See T. SOWELL, supra note 100, at 118.
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freedom of speech gained as more important than any improvement in
the economic problems still facing modern Western societies.
At the level of applied political philosophy, however, Rawls'
strong commitment to simple, clear, lexically ranked principles fares
much better. The political temptation to restrict the true sources of
the opposition's power - free thought, free speech, voting, the right to
hold office - and to justify such action with noblesse oblige principles
is great. 106 Rawls' prescription here is sufficiently clear that a political
actor whose power was legitimized by Rawlsian principles but who
was tempted to stray from them under the new incentives of power
would find it extremely difficult to do so in the case of the basic liberties. Rawls repeatedly stresses that he wants to identify political principles that will take hold of the mind in such a way as to secure their
faithful implementation, and he correctly holds that simplicity is an
important virtue in a theory's ability to perform that applied political
philosophy function.101
Once again, these abstract points take on concrete significance in
actual cases, including decisions under the freedom of speech clause of
the first amendment. For example, in Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 108 the Court sustained an order requiring the
Communist Party to register with the Subversive Activities Control
Board of the Attorney General's office. The Court emphasized the
detailed legislative findings regarding the problem of possible Communist subversion. Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter saw
the question in pure normative philosophy terms, i.e., the importance
as values of liberty and the preservation of the nation:
[W]here the problems of accommodating the exigencies of self-preservation and the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as [here], ...
the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best be met consistently with the safeguarding of personal freedom is not to be set aside
merely because the judgment of judges would, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods.10 9

Stating the issue as Justice Frankfurter does, it may be difficult to
disagree, since the preservation of the nation is a precondition to all of
the liberties protected by that nation. Unfortunately, Justice Frankfurter failed to see the issue from the perspective of applied political
philosophy, with its central concern for the corruptible empirical judgment of the powerful regarding criticism of government policy. In this
106. See J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 544 (trading off liberty for welfare would ultimately be
poor strategy for those in the original position).
107. See id. at 320-2 I.
108. 367 U.S. I (1961).
109. 367 U.S. at 96-97.
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respect, New York Times Co. v. United States, 110 the Pentagon Papers
case, represents the contrary perspective of applied political philosophy. The government argued that publication of the Pentagon Papers
would seriously damage national security and should be enjoined. In a
per curiam opinion, the Court held that the injunction violated the
first amendment. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion stated: "The
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information."111 The issue was not the pure normative question of national
security versus press liberty; it was the applied political philosophy
question of restrictions on press liberty that purport, perhaps quite
sincerely, to serve the national security in a context where the state's
incentive to see such dangers in any embarrassing disclosures is extraordinarily powerful.
V.

NOZICK AND THE LIBERTARIANS

Robert Nozick's book Anarchy, State, and Utopia is yet another
attempt to straddle pure normative philosophy and applied political
philosophy with one set of concepts. 112 Nozick argues for a minimal
state that enforces preexisting rights to one's own body and talents as
well as rights to acquire and transfer property in external resources.
He argues that further actions by the state violate people's rights and
are therefore morally unjustified. 113
As with all such attempts to fulfill both functions of political philosophy with the same philosophical ideal, tensions between the functions are likely to arise, and it is interesting to see exactly where that
schism occurs in yet another context. The problems with Nozick's
philosophy are almost the polar opposite of the utilitarian's problems.
As noted earlier, utilitarianism as a pure normative philosophy is imperfect but probably not so seriously wrong that one would not greatly
appreciate a chance to live in a world in which policies actually satisfied its requirements. 114 However, utilitarianism makes a poor applied
political philosophy that would leave no meaningful check on the
temptations arising from the Leviathan state.
By contrast, Nozick's position represents a poor first best pure nor110. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
111. 403 U.S. at 723-24.
112. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 6 ("Moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they
may do through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus.").
113. Id. at 149.
114. See text following note 64 supra.
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mative philosophy but a much better applied political philosophy.
The fact that Nozick's philosophy, like utilitarianism, purports to
serve both functions is, I believe, the source of the ambivalence many
people feel about these ideas. Indeed, it is hard to read either philosophy without experiencing an alternating attraction and repulsion, a
paradoxical reaction that suggests a deep distinction is being smoothed
over.
Consider first Nozick's theory as a pure normative philosophy that
explicitly contrasts itself with utilitarianism as a normative philosophy .115 It is certainly true that utilitarianism justifies some unfortunate results, such as the coercive use of individuals for the amusement
of others. As such, it seems perfectly appropriate to acknowledge
moral rights that trump utility maximization in some instances along
the lines of Rawls' theory, or at least presumptive moral rights that
can be outweighed only when the balance of utility strongly favors the
coercive exaction. But it is one thing to recognize a minimum inviolability of persons that must be respected in any endeavor to maximize
happiness; it is quite another to make those moral rights or entitlements so extensive that happiness is virtually banished as a morally
legitimate end of the state. Are property rights so important that successful attempts to minimize widespread misery and suffering by limiting such rights would be morally illegitimate? Such a view simply
drains rights of their moral significance. 11 6
Of course, Nozick is aware of the philosophical importance of
human happiness, but his idea is that there ought to be moral side
constraints on a human actor's ability to pursue those good ends. 117 It
simply is not right, Nozick holds, to use a human being without her
consent as if she were an inanimate object even for the purpose of
increasing happiness. 118 Nor is it right to use property that a person
created or was purposely given as if it were manna from heaven. 11 9 In
short, Nozick seeks to make his vision intuitively attractive by directing attention away from the end states in question and toward the
propriety of particular human actions.
115. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 35-53 (arguing for moral side constraints on actions affecting humans that utilitarianism lacks; also arguing that we care about more than conscious experiences, as is shown by imagining an "experience machine").
116. See Scheffler, Natural Rights, Equality, and the Minimal State, in READING NOZICK
148, 160 (J. Paul ed. 1981).
117. See R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 26-35.
118. Id. at 32.
119. Thus Nozick criticizes Rawls' position for creating a philosophical system that makes
the failure to take such action appear irrational. "[P]eople meeting together behind a veil of
ignorance to decide who gets what, knowing nothing about any special entitlements people may
have, will treat anything to be distributed as manna from heaven." Id. at 199.
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Although these arguments about right and wrong conduct are not
without some intuitive force, the stronger intuitions of modern man
are drawn to the tangible evil of human suffering and the felt need for
purposeful human action rationally calculated to alleviate that suffering. At the pure normative philosophy level, the idea of an absolute
side constraint upon the abridgement of minor values even for the purpose of furthering major values seems irrational. 120 Nozick poses a
similar question explicitly:
Isn't it irrational to accept a side constraint C, rather than a view that
directs minimizing the violations of C? (The latter view treats C as a
condition rather than a constraint.) If nonviolation of C is so important,
shouldn't that be the goal? How can a concern for the nonviolation of C
lead to a refusal to violate C even when this would prevent other more
extensive violations of C? What is the rationale for placing the nonviolation of rights as a side constraint upon action instead of including it
solely as a goal of one's actions? 121

Nozick is not alone in concluding that side constraints upon wrong
actions do indeed apply even if the action would prevent even more
wrong actions. Charles Fried also defends categorical theses such as
"Do not intentionally kill innocent people" even where such an action
would spare the lives of many. 122 The Ten Commandments and other
religious sources seem to prohibit certain kinds of actions without inquiry into their noble purposes. Immanuel Kant warned that one
must not use a person solely as a means, presumably including as a
means toward otherwise highly valuable ends. 123 No one who was
raised in Western culture can be totally lacking in sympathy for the
idea of categorically wrong action. And yet the mind rebels against
the irrationality of not recognizing twice E to be a more serious evil
than E.
Once again, the writer who has seen these paradoxes most clearly
is Friedrich Hayek. Hayek argues that many of our moral intuitions
are the product of biological and especially social evolution, in that
peoples who held such views were generally more successful in advancing their purposes and taming natural hazards than others. 124 As
120.
121.
122.
123.
1964).

See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 30 (emphasis in original).
C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H. Paton trans.

124. See F. HAYEK, The Origins a11d Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science. in THE
EsSF.NCF. OF HAYEK 318, 320 (1984) (arguing that "Social Darwinism" was a mistake because

social evolution operates "through a different mechanism'' than biological evolution, although
both historical processes '"relie[d) on the same principles of selection, namely the multiplication
of individual lives").
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such, Hayek, following Hume, argues that such moral intuitions are
not the outcome of our reason and are quite likely to strike our conscious intellect as irrational. 125 Nevertheless, Hayek defends such
morals as having a more secure foundation in proven success than an
alternative moral system we might mentally construct from our views
about first principles. 126 He too reaches the libertarian conclusion that
all actors, including the state, ought to feel constrained to respect the
rules and principles that define and circumscribe both personal freedom and property rights.121
Since Hayek's views played an important role in the prior section's
analysis of Critical Legal Studies as well, it is important to be clear
about the limitations as well as the merits of his perspective. From an
intellectual point of view, Hayek's thesis is disturbing because it seems
to advocate a form of self-hypnosis, i.e., that our moral intuitions are
only instruments directed toward higher goals such as survival and
utility, but we should quickly forget that linkage and convince ourselves that the morality itself is in fact more important than those
higher goals. 128 This article has taken a different approach, seeking to
rationalize these paradoxes - to explain them in a way the rational
mind will not rebel against. There is a reason why the applied political
philosophy that a political actor should consciously strive to advance
differs from the first principles of pure normative philosophy. Indeed,
there are at least the four reasons that were identified in the introductory section of the article. There is no need to hide the true first best
values from political actors out of fear that they will seek to pursue
them directly; what is needed is for political actors themselves to realize that some moral standards require factual assessments that are systematically untrustworthy, and therefore that arguments directly
addressed to such broader values ought not to be politically
entertained. 129
125. See id. at 318-19:
[I]n some respects our morals endow us with capacities greater than our reason could do,
namely the ability to adapt to conditions of which the individual mind could never be
aware.... It is the reason why, as David Hume so clearly understood, "the rules of moral·
ity are not the conclusions of our reason."
126. Id. at 324-25. Hayek argues that the benefits of the process of social evolution apply
only to the grown morals of tradition and not to morals which have been invented to serve
the satisfaction of human desires. . . . Hedonistic, utilitarian, or egalitarian morals, or conceptions like distributive justice, are all intellectual inventions which have never been tested
and have never been shown that they improve, or even could secure, the preservation of the
group.
127. See ge11eral/y F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
128. Id. at 68 ('•Like all moral principles, [liberty] demands that it be accepted as a value in
itself.... We shall not achieve the results we want if we do not accept it as a creed or presump·
tion so strong that no considerations of expediency can be allowed to limit it.").
129. On the general structure of arguments for the indirect pursuit of ethical goals, see Alex-

October 1987]

Political Philosophy and Law

153

When one moves from the level of pure normative philosophy to
the level of applied political philosophy, the verdict upon Nozick's
book improves substantially. Nozick is, of course, greatly concerned
with avoiding the horrors of twentieth-century experiences with totalitarianism and its characteristic institutions such as compulsory labor, 130 restrictions on emigration, 131 and "reeducation camps." 13 2
Nozick's contribution is to explain how these horrible institutions can
come to seem logical to one who begins with the humanitarian desire
to enforce a distributional pattern of the form "to each according to
his
." 133 For liberty of any sort - purposely acting on the
basis of principles different from the principles of the pattern - will
persistently frustrate and anger the government official who accepts
the idea that deviations from the pattern are injustices. 134
This argument of Nozick's also does not succeed at the level of
pure normative philosophy, where one could simply advocate an optimal mix of liberty and distributional pattern. 135 But Nozick is again
persuasive in explaining the naivete of seeking to transfer this "optimality" insight to the level of applied political philosophy where the
initial restrictions of liberty generate their own dynamic that is driven
by symbiosis between the growing state and economic power holders:
To strengthen the state and extend the range of its functions as a way of
preventing it from being used by some portion of the populace makes it a
more valuable prize and a more alluring target for corrupting by anyone
able to offer an officeholder something desirable; it is, to put it gently, a
poor strategy. 136

By contrast, Nozick observes that the institution of private property sets in motion a different dynamic. Nozick rejects the idea that
the institution of private property represents the taking of value from a
preexisting common pool, since the informational and incentive effects
ander, Pursuing the Good-/11directly. 95 ETHICS 315 (1985). Alexander does note that one way
of resolving the general paradox is to refuse to publicize the fact that one is advocating the first
best goals, but at the level of political philosophy such secrecy is both difficult and dangerous.
See id. at 325-29.
130. See R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 169-72.
131. See id. at 173-74.
132. See id. at 163.
133. See id. at 159-64.
134. See id.
135. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 506-07 (1980).
[I]f we value individual liberty, we are bound to reach a point at which further restrictions
on conduct cannot be justified by the additional increment of distributive fairness that they
yield....
This conflict does not, however, provide a reason for abandoning liberalism altogether
since it is not a crushing objection to a theory of society that it values two different things
which conflict even across a wide range of cases.
136. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 272.
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of property expand that pool many orders of magnitude. 137 The key
point for Nozick is not that property might produce utilitarian gains
but rather that a state official can act to protect property without accepting any vision that calls for the purposeful state preference of particular people over others, i.e., without accepting a vision that
generates the dynamic of an increasingly corruptible rent-seeking
state. 138
Unfortunately, Nozick is no clearer than Rawls or the utilitarians
about whether his theory is offered at the level of pure normative philosophy or at the level of applied political philosophy. Is he saying
that there is no moral balancing that can take place between individuals or that a government official ought not to believe she should be
conducting such a balancing? Again, the truth seems to be that
Nozick is making both claims. 139 But surely this attempt to hold together two discrete disciplines severely strains one's intuitions at the
level of pure normative philosophy; a person born blind and disabled
ought not to have to beg for charity to lead a decent life. The problem
is to find a way to enshrine the most urgent comparative claims in
political institutions without state officials' coming to accept the corruptible general vision of coercive moral balancing between individuals or a just distributional pattern. Focusing upon the distinction
between pure normative philosophy and applied political philosophy
may not supply the answer to this problem, but it at least directs attention to the relevant question.
To the extent that Nozick is aware of the distinction between the
two functions of political philosophy, it does appear that it is the applied political philosophy function he most wants his theory to fulfill.
This is displayed most clearly in Nozick's vision of Utopia, where he
plainly indicates that his libertarian applied political philosophy is ultimately instrumentally justified by its contribution to values other
than (or in addition to) liberty and property. 140 Nozick imagines
someone's saying "So is this all it comes to: Utopia is a free society?"
and Nozick responds:
Utopia is not just a society in which the framework is realized. For who
could believe that ten minutes after the framework was established, we
would have utopia? Things would be no different than now. It is what
grows spontaneously from the individual choices of many people over a
137. Id. at 177.
138. Id. at 272-73.
139. The rent-seeking problem is discussed by Nozick, id. at 272-73. However, Nozick also
clearly states, "Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the
others. Nothing more.... Talk of an overall social good covers this up." Id. at 33.
140. Id. at 297-334.
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long period of time that will be worth speaking eloquently about. 141

To summarize the argument, Nozick's philosophy suffers from a
problem that is almost the direct opposite of the utilitarian's problems.
Utilitarianism makes a tolerable, if imperfect, pure normative philosophy, but any failing to see the distinction between disciplines is likely
to favor utilitarianism also as an applied political philosophy, where it
fails badly. Nozick's vision makes a tolerable if imperfect applied
political philosophy, but one who sees its political wisdom may also be
tempted to embrace its harsh normative philosophy, where it surely
ought to be rejected. Or, alternatively, one who sees Nozick's serious
shortcomings at the pure normative philosophy level may overlook the
book's great merit of the level of applied political philosophy. These
are the recurring problems of failing to recognize the two functions of
political philosophy as distinct.
VI.

CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE AND POSITIVE ANALYSIS IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

This article has sought to establish the thesis that political philosophy can be clarified and ultimately improved by focusing attention
upon the two distinct functions such a philosophy can serve. Greater
analytical clarity in turn makes it appear that at least one part of political philosophy - the sphere of applied political philosophy - cannot
be separated from factual theories of cause-and-effect in the area of
social phenomena. For the questions of how legal actors will interact
with a philosophy, whether their adherence to the philosophy will remain stable, and what unintended consequences will follow from the
interactions that arise, are factual questions in need of scientific investigation. More particularly, the microeconomic discipline of public
choice theory, which directs attention explicitly to the information
and incentives facing public decisionmakers, ought to be integrated
fully with normative analysis in arriving at a sensible applied political
philosophy. 142 The question of what values actual legal actors ought
to hold in a world that is causally connected in particular ways must
be seen as a complex question requiring positive as well as normative
analysis.

141. Id. at 332 (emphasis in original).
142. See, e.g., Goldin, Price Extemalities J11jlue11ce Public Policy, 23 Pue. CHOICE l, 5-6
(1975); M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 36 (1965); J. BUCHANAN & G.
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 36-39 (1962).

